Upsurge in Kurdish Attacks Raises Pressure on Turkish PM To Invade Iraq

· Bomb brings death toll of soldiers in one day to 15 · Erdogan caught between public opinion and U.S.

The Guardian reports:

Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, came under intense pressure last night to order an invasion of northern Iraq following the deadliest attacks for over a decade on the Turkish military and civilians by separatist Kurdish guerrillas.
Mr Erdogan, who has resisted demands from the Turkish armed forces for the past six months for a green light to cross the border into Iraqi Kurdistan, where the guerrillas are based, called an emergency meeting of national security chiefs to ponder their options in the crisis, a session that some said was tantamount to a war council.

A Turkish incursion is fiercely opposed by Washington since it would immensely complicate the US campaign in Iraq and destabilise the only part of Iraq that functions, the Kurdish-controlled north.

Two Turkish soldiers were killed yesterday in booby trap explosions laid by guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK) - fighters classified as terrorists by Ankara, Washington and the European Union. Those casualties followed the killing of 13 Turkish soldiers in the south-east on Sunday when PKK forces outgunned a Turkish unit of 18 men without sustaining any casualties, according to the Kurds.

Last week, in an ambush also ascribed to the PKK, gunmen sprayed a bus with automatic fire in the same region, killing 13 civilians, including a boy of seven.

The Turkish media described the toll from the attacks as the worst in 12 years in a conflict spanning several decades that has taken almost 40,000 lives.

Mr Erdogan is known to think little of the invasion option, making the pragmatic calculation that it would probably fail. Western diplomats in Ankara agree that an invasion could be counter-productive. The Turkish military raided Iraqi Kurdistan dozens of times in the 1990s but were unable to suppress the insurgency.

After a cabinet meeting dominated by the Kurdish conflict, Cemil Cicek, the Turkish government spokesman, said yesterday: "What is at issue here is how much any action we decide to take would bring us closer to a result." He did not rule out an invasion but queried its "usefulness".

The prime minister, however, is being challenged by the army command, which earlier this year demanded his authority to invade. He is also vulnerable to a mounting public clamour to act because of the upsurge in guerrilla activity and the heavy casualties being suffered. Hardline Turkish nationalists entered parliament in Ankara following elections in July and they are also baying for Kurdish blood.

Following the soldiers' deaths on Sunday, Mr Erdogan signalled a shift in policy without specifying how. "Our campaign against terrorism will continue in a different manner," he said. The Turkish military has just declared 27 "security zones" on the Iraqi and Iranian borders off-limits to civilians, suggesting to some that it might be gearing up for an invasion.

But despite the rising violence, Mr Erdogan has opted for politics in his attempts to defuse the conflict with the Kurds. His Justice and Development party (AKP) enjoyed a stunning success among the Kurdish minority, concentrated in the south-east, in the July elections and he has also focused on political pacts with Baghdad to get the better of the guerrillas.

Last week Iraqi and Turkish interior ministers signed an accord aimed at combating the PKK by trying to cut the rebels' funding and logistics, and agreeing to extradite captured "terrorists". The accord, however, took three days to thrash out; Turkish insistence on a "hot pursuit" formula, allowing cross-border raids, was denied, and scepticism is high as to whether Baghdad can deliver.

Officially, Ankara refuses to recognise or deal with the government of Iraqi Kurdistan, although there have been back-channel attempts over the past year to engage with Massoud Barzani, the president of the Iraqi Kurdish region.

Mr Erdogan's options are also constrained by strong US hostility to an invasion. While Turkish public opinion has been strongly anti-American since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, much of the logistical support for the US troops goes to Iraq via Turkey. Relations are also under severe strain because of US congressional moves to brand the 1915 massacres of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey as "genocide".

Mr Erdogan sent aides to Washington yesterday to lobby Congress on the "genocide" resolution. Ankara is also warning that it could block the logistical support to the US in Iraq if the resolution is passed.

PKK guerrillas

The Kurdish separatist guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers' party, or PKK, have been at war with the Turkish state since the early 1980s. Although it is now said to favour home rule within Turkey over secession, the PKK has historically pursued the breakaway of Kurdish-dominated south-east Turkey as a prelude to unifying Kurdish lands in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Turkey pursued a scorched earth policy in the 1980s and 1990s, destroying thousands of villages, sending millions of Kurds west and leaving some 37,000 dead. Turkey's biggest coup came in 1999 with the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who was jailed for life.

Torn Between Democracy, The Military and Islam

The Independent reports:
Incredible though it seems, a country that is currently negotiating full membership of the European Union may be teetering on the brink of a military coup. The political and economic meltdown in Turkey over the election of a new president has brought the generals out of the shadows and the voters on to the streets in their hundreds of thousands.
The crisis began on Friday when Abdullah Gul, who comes from the Islamic-rooted AK Party, failed to win enough votes in Parliament to take the symbolic post of president, first held by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Hours later the army high command made clear their opposition to Mr Gul, whose wife wears a headscarf - one of the touchstone issues of Turkish politics. This is Turkey's biggest showdown between Islam and secularism in recent years; a country that aspires to be the bridge between Europe and the Muslim world is at a critical juncture.

In Turkey, it is important to appreciate, the army sees itself as one of the main guardians of the secular state. In the current context, the generals style themselves as protectors of liberalism against those who wish to make Turkey a more Islamic and less tolerant society. Over the past 50 years the military has mounted three coups and helped to oust an Islamist government in 1997. This time, though, their reaction took many by surprise.

The nomination of Mr Gul for the presidency had been widely seen as a conciliatory sign because it averted the likelihood of the job going to the more divisive Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. So why has his candidature provoked such a crisis? One reason is the alarm among the secularists about the political programme of the AK Party and its growing power. Mr Erdogan pressed, unsuccessfully, for the criminalisation of adultery (backing down only under acute pressure for the EU) and his party has campaigned to restrict alcohol sales.

From Ankara, moreover, the Prime Minister's decision not to contest the presidency looks less of a concession than a political tactic. With the popular Erdogan remaining at its head, rather than in the presidency, AK stands an excellent chance of winning the next parliamentary elections. It would end up with the posts of prime minister, president and speaker of Parliament - a dominance unrivalled by an Islamic-influenced party.

Perhaps the second reason is the stalling of Turkey's engagement with Europe. The prospect of EU membership has been an important element in Turkish politics because it offers something to both sides of the divide. It would mean more rights for those, for example, who wear headscarves, while also guaranteeing the fundamental Western freedoms held dear by the secularists. Turkey's EU ambitions, however, have been fading fast. With sentiment against Turkish membership hardening in France, Germany and Austria, there is a backlash among secular Turks who feel they are destined never to join the group that Germany's former chancellor Kohl described as a Christian club.

For Turkey the next few days will be crucial. The country's top court is likely to rule today on whether Mr Gul can stand for the second round of voting in the presidential contest. Whatever the verdict, the army must refrain from meddling further and accept that democracy sometimes delivers difficult results. Meanwhile the AK Party must do more to reassure its critics that it is not about to challenge the fundamentals of the secular Turkish state. Once the immediate crisis is over, both Turkey and the EU must work harder to make Ankara's membership negotiations work. The past few days have shown that there is no palatable alternative.

Turkish Army Demands Incursion Into Iraq

The Independent reports:
Turkey's military chief asked the government yesterday to approve an incursion into Iraq, increasing pressure on the US and Iraq to fight Kurdish guerrillas.

But military action was likely to be used only as a last resort: it would strain ties with Washington and could spark a mutiny from Kurdish lawmakers within Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's own party ahead of elections in November, analysts said.

"An operation into Iraq is necessary," General Yasar Buyukanit said, adding that his forces were fighting more than 2,000 guerrillas in the border region operating from within Turkey.

Ankara has been battling separatist Kurdish rebels in southeastern Turkey since 1984. The Turkish military recently reinforced its troops in the predominantly Kurdish southeast.

Turkey is aware of the consequences a military incursion into Iraq could have.

"There is no way that our American friends would welcome such a move by Turkey," said Ilter Turan, of Istanbul's Bilgi University. "The idea is to persuade the Americans to address the problem more urgently than they have been."

In Washington, the State Department said Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried had expressed US concerns directly to Turkish authorities.

"The way we suggest it be dealt with is to have the Iraqis and Turkish governments working together to try to eliminate this threat," spokesman Sean McCormack said.

Ankara fears Iraqi Kurds are seeking an independent Kurdish state that could encourage separatist Kurds inside Turkey. Relations with Iraqi Kurds deteriorated further this week when Masoud Barzani, leader of the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, said Iraqi Kurds would retaliate for any Turkish interference by stirring up trouble in Turkey's southeast.

On Monday, Ankara demanded action against the Iraq-based guerrillas, vowing to do the job itself if Iraq was not able to. Turkey is a key trade partner of Iraqi Kurds and it could shut down the Habur border and stop electricity supplies to try and force the Iraqi Kurds into action

Who Controls Iraq's Oil Decisions?

At Niqash, Greg Muttit writes:
The debate over national vs. regional control of Iraq’s oil sector intensified last week, as the new Natural Resources Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) stated his opposition to amending the oil-related articles of the Constitution.

In his first public statement since his appointment, Dr Ashti Hawrami argued that, “the Constitution was adopted as a package by all the people; it is a single document … The rights of the regions and governorates are clear and cannot be modified in any way to enhance the powers of federal authorities.”

He was responding to calls by Iraqi oil experts to use the agreed constitutional review process, culminating in a second referendum, to change the controversial articles, which are seen by some as ambiguous, contradictory or impractical.

The Constitution grants the federal government control only over “current fields”. In most interpretations, the regions and governorates would control all other fields. However, the meaning of “current fields” is unclear.

Iraq has about 80 known oilfields, and many more fields likely still to be found in unexplored areas. Of these 80, only about 20 have ever been developed, and some of those have only partially been developed, producing oil at a fraction of their potential rate. These latter include the four super-giant fields of Majnoon, West Qurna, Nahr Umar and East Baghdad, which between them contain nearly half of Iraq’s total reserves.

A recent research paper by oil expert Kamil Mehaidi pointed out that it is unclear whether the term “current fields” refers to all discovered fields, to those currently in production (accounting for about 78% of Iraq’s known reserves), or just to those which have been fully developed (about 36% of reserves).

Natural Resources Minister Hawrami interpreted current fields as those which are producing oil now. But he went much further, arguing that the regions and governorates should control all of the revenue from undeveloped fields, and should have effective veto power even over the limited roles he prescribed for the federal government.

It is worth considering separately the political issue of who takes the revenue and the more technical issue of who has management control.

Most people accept that some share of revenue should stay in the region in which it was produced, and this is common around the world – it compensates regions for their investment in infrastructure and for the environmental impacts of oil production. However, over time the balance of Iraq’s oil production will shift from fields which are now “current” to those which are new. Thus, with Iraq’s oil mostly concentrated in the south and the north of the country, to give all revenue from non-“current fields” to producing regions could leave other areas – notably the centre and west – impoverished.

The greatest disputes are over who should control oil decisions, such as strategy, policy, operational management, and the role of the private sector, including signing of contracts. Those who argue that regional autonomy should be maximised are concerned that in a centralised system some regions might be de-prioritised for investment and access to resources, a concern felt especially by many Kurds. Others fear that too much autonomy could sow the seeds of division of the country.

Meanwhile, many technocrats argue that too much decentralisation brings the risk of an uncoordinated and bureaucratic system, in which each region has its own approach and procedures. The need for coordination is most obvious with strategic infrastructure that either physically spans more than one region or province, such as pipelines, or serves more than one, such as refineries. Similarly, geology does not recognise administrative borders, and several oilfields straddle more than one province, and potentially more than one region. In the absence of clear coordination, competing authorities keen to maximise their production could damage the geology of an oilfield by overproducing on their side – the problem that at a national level has caused disputes between Iraq and Kuwait.

But the oil federalism issue should not be isolated from the equally big issue of privatisation. Dr Hawrami’s comments on the Constitution came two weeks after the Kurdistan Regional Government signed an oil-production contract with the Canadian company Western Oilsands, the fourth such deal signed by the KRG. It had previously signed contracts with Norwegian company DNO in June 2004, and with Turkish companies Genel Enerji in January 2004 and Petoil in April 2003. DNO recently announced the discovery of oil near Zakho in Dohuk province.

The legal status of these deals is hotly contested, with the Oil Ministry in Baghdad arguing that only it has the right to sign such contracts. On the other hand, Kurdish authorities have argued that the KRG is authorised by the Constitution to sign contracts – even though the first three were signed even before the Constitution was first drafted. It is far from clear how this dispute will be resolved.

All four contracts are with small companies. The major international oil companies are unlikely to invest while there is such legal uncertainty, at least until the finalisation of the Constitution, due to the high risk of losing their investments if the contracts are ultimately found not to be valid. As in any investment, the higher the risk taken by an investor, the higher the profit they will expect, to make it worth their while. So it is likely that these contracts give a very high share of revenue to the companies, with a correspondingly lower share going to the public authorities.

However, the detailed terms of the deals – the revenue split, the legal terms and even the duration of the contracts – are mostly unknown, as they have not been disclosed. For citizens and civil society organisations to know what the revenue terms are is an important defence against corruption, as well as providing for democratic scrutiny.

But although private companies are cautious about legal uncertainty, they benefit from negotiating with weaker public institutions. The regions and provinces do not have the strategic and negotiation experience that is possessed by the Oil Ministry in Baghdad. And if the Kurds’ precedent is followed elsewhere, the result could be a race to the bottom, in which different regions compete with each other to attract investment by offering greater shares of revenue – and more generous legal terms – to private companies.

While the desire for greater regional autonomy is understandable, it could in fact end up also transferring power – and more of Iraq’s oil wealth – from public to private sector, and from Iraqis to foreign companies.