Guests: Richard Wolffe, E.J. Dionne, Jonathan Cohn, Kent Jones
Transcript:
RACHEL MADDOW, HOST: Happy New Year to you, Keith. It‘s great to have you back. Thanks.
We begin tonight with some breaking news. On the White House investigation into exactly what happens with the Christmas Day botched terror attempt. MSNBC political analyst Richard Wolffe is actually joining us now by phone with that.
Richard, I know you just shared some reporting on COUNTDOWN about a potentially very inflammatory development in the Christmas Day terror plot investigation. What can you tell us about that reporting and what else you‘ve been able to learn?
RICHARD WOLFFE, MSNBC POLITICAL ANALYST: Well, Rachel, this investigation is still very much at the fact-finding stage where the White House is looking at still what happened. It‘s very preliminary. Obviously, the president has just got back from vacation and just started prepping for his big session tomorrow—which I‘m told is still going to focus on things like the screening processes that people face.
But the question here is whether or not the systemic failure that the president has talked about was anything more than human error. Was this some kind of failure because of the system‘s internal tensions? Or was there actually just a surplus of information that people didn‘t understand or report fully?
So, the question about how intelligence was shared is very much uppermost in the president‘s mind. He is still—I am told—very steamed about the whole affair and the failings that led to such a serious breach of security. But it‘s still very early in the phase of where this investigation is going.
MADDOW: Richard, I believe that the—I think the reason that you‘re reporting tonight has an exclamation point on it for many of us who saw your interview on COUNTDOWN, you were thinking about where this might led, is the prospect, not just that intelligence leads that should have been followed weren‘t followed, that intelligence dots that should have been connected weren‘t connected, that there isn‘t enough communication among the different parts of the American intelligence community. That‘s important analysis but not new analysis.
What‘s new and very worrying is the prospect that intelligence was deliberately withheld by one part of the American intelligence community from another either because of a grudge to make somebody look bad or for any other reason that put petty politics above national security.
Is that, in fact, the path that this White House inquiry is going down?
WOLFFE: That I think is 10 steps ahead of where the White House is right now.
MADDOW: OK.
WOLFFE: I just checked in with White House people again. And, look, there are—there‘s lots of finger-pointing going on in the intelligence community, where you have people who are in the center of it all, who are tasked with pulling these things together who say the information was there and it wasn‘t flagged up or it wasn‘t shared adequately. So, there is a line of inquiry that goes to the heart of why wasn‘t this stuff shared adequately?
I think the early suspicions from inside the White House are that this comes down to human error more than this is some willful withholding. But the questions are being asked and they‘re being asked because some people are saying this stuff wasn‘t shared adequately and they say it could have been.
MADDOW: MSNBC analyst Richard Wolffe joining us, helping us sort out what‘s turning out to be both a fascinating story and a deeply troubling story about America‘s response to the terror alert or the terror incident on Christmas Day, and what we could have pieced together ahead of time.
Richard, thanks very much for your time. We appreciate it.
WOLFFE: Thank you, Rachel.
MADDOW: All right. We begin our first show of 2010, now, with the death of a political truism that doesn‘t seem to have survived 2009. The truism is the conventional wisdom that Republicans sure know how to do terror politics. 2010 being an election year—right now, Republicans all over the country are busy waxing poetic about terrorism on campaign trails all around the country.
For example there‘s this gentleman in Minnesota.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
ALLEN QUIST (R-MN), HOUSE CANDIDATE: I, like you, have seen that our country is being destroyed. I mean, this is—every generation has had to fight the fight for freedom. This is our fight. And this is our time.
This is it. Terrorism, yes. But that‘s not the big battle. The big battle is in D.C. with the radicals. They‘re not liberals. They‘re radicals. They are destroying our country.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
MADDOW: House candidate Allen Quist of Minnesota. Terrorism isn‘t the big battle. The big battle is between us and the liberals.
That sort of political speech right there is what it looks like when something that used to work for you stops working. Someone obviously once told that Republican congressional candidate in Minnesota, “Hey, you should campaign on terrorism. That always works out great for Republicans.”
That is the common wisdom and it might have been true at one point, but it does actually matter how you do it. And if you‘re saying things like, “I hate Democrats more than I hate al Qaeda,” I‘m pretty sure you‘re not doing it right.
Now that the calendar has flipped to 2010 we‘re experiencing a little outbreak of Republicans blowing it. Republicans blowing something they used to be pretty good at, the politicization of terrorism.
The latest is Republican Senator Kit Bond of Missouri. In trying to attack President Obama‘s handling of the Christmas Day underpants bomber, Mr. Bond stepped on the same rake that a number of his colleagues have already recently stepped on.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
CHRIS WALLACE, FOX NEWS: Do you think it was a mistake to charge Abdulmutallab as a criminal defendant?
SEN. KIT BOND ®, MISSOURI: Clearly. As you said, in your interview, as soon as he got a lawyer, he lawyered up. We should have held him as an enemy combatant and tried him under the military commissions.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
MADDOW: We should have held him as an enemy combatant.
After facing questions about why he thinks President Obama is wrong to try the Christmas Day bomber in federal court, when President Bush made the exact same decision about the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, back in 2002, Senator Bond, after facing those questions, decided to double-down apparently without checking his own record. The senator is now seeking to go back in time to try to create the impression that he was against the shoe bomber being charged in federal court back in 2002, now, calling it a mistake—even though Senator Bond made not one peep of protest about that at the time.
In fact, at the time, the Justice Department, the Bush Justice Department was prosecuting Richard Reid—at that time, Senator Kit Bond was asked specifically if he had any criticism of the Bush Justice Department‘s role in fighting terrorism. Senator Bond said he had none.
(BEGIN AUDIO CLIP)
BOND: I believe that the Department of Justice is observing constitutional guidelines and safeguards, but they‘re going after people who come from areas of the world which might spawn terrorists, and I think that‘s appropriate.
(END AUDIO CLIP)
MADDOW: In 2002, he said what the Justice Department was doing was appropriate. Now looking back on it he says, back in 2002, that was a huge mistake—huge mistake to use the Justice Department for this sort of thing. How dare Obama do this now, this thing I said at the time was appropriate?
Then there‘s Republican Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina. And after facing pressure for putting an indefinite hold on President Obama‘s nominee to run transportation security, Mr. DeMint has now, sort of, caved, saying that he‘ll allow a vote on the TSA nominee as long as he gets time to debate the nomination on the Senate floor. While caving on the TSA issue, Senator DeMint continues to embarrassing himself—embarrass himself by pressing another issue.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIPS)
SEN. JIM DEMINT ®, SOUTH CAROLINA: A lot of us have been concerned over the last year that the president did seem to downplay the threat of terror. He doesn‘t use the word anymore.
GLORIA BORGER, CNN: Senator DeMint, how has he downplayed the risk of terror?
DEMINT: Well, it begins with not even being willing to use the word.
The concern that a lot of us have had over the last year is we‘ve even dropped the word “terror.”
(END VIDEO CLIPS)
MADDOW: You know, when you see Jim DeMint saying this sort of thing, it might be useful to remember that he‘s just making it up as he goes along. You should hear a little laugh track in your head when he does that, as evidenced by President Obama repeatedly on tape saying this word that Jim DeMint says he never says.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIPS)
BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: Terror and extremism that threatens the world‘s stability.
Extremists sewing terror in pockets of the world.
Suffering and civil wars that breed instability and terror.
New acts of terror.
(END VIDEO CLIPS)
MADDOW: When Jim DeMint says that Barack Obama never uses the word “terror,” he‘s lying. It should probably be pointed out when that happens.
As we have noted here before the outbreak of people inexpertly trying to politicize terrorism, trying to politicize terrorism but blowing it, that effort sort of has a mascot in Republican Congressman Pete Hoekstra of Michigan. Mr. Hoekstra is now apparently unwilling to defend his decision to raise money off of the attempted murder of 300 Americans on Christmas Day.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Are you proud of that, of fundraising off the national crisis like that?
REP. PETE HOEKSTRA ®, MICHIGAN: Well, I‘ve been leading on national security for the last nine years that I‘ve been on the intelligence committee. And over the last two to three months, I‘ve been very concerned about where this administration is taking us on national security issues, the refusal to acknowledge that the Fort Hood attack was a terrorist attack.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: But I‘m asking about raising money off the attempted murder of 300 people three days after it occurred.
HOEKSTRA: I am proud of the role that I have played in making sure that America is safe.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
MADDOW: Mr. Hoekstra dodging that question not once but twice yesterday. And that‘s actually a big change from the way the Hoekstra camp had been talking about his raising money off a terrorist attack against American citizens.
Just last week, Mr. Hoekstra‘s campaign told us that Pete Hoekstra himself signed off on that fundraising letter and that we should expect more similar efforts from him. Just a few days later, Congressman Hoekstra has been forced to become embarrassed about this. Now, apparently, unwilling to defend the effort when he‘s personally called out on it.
Even as Mr. Hoekstra apparently realizes the step on the rake face plant that he has made here, trying to raise money off of the attempted murder of 300 Americans on Christmas Day, three days after it happened, even as Hoekstra finally starts to get embarrassed about that, the Republican Party seems to be following Mr. Hoekstra‘s lead.
The National Republican Senatorial Committee sending out a fundraising pitch that reads in part, quote, “This country was one faulty detonator away from an American airliner being blown out of the sky. When a foreigner tries to blow up an airliner, it is an attempted terrorist attack. Will you please give $5 or $10 by midnight tomorrow so we have the money necessary to fight the Obama machine?”
The National Republican Congressional Committee also sending out its own fundraising e-mail using the specter of terrorist attacks against Americans to cash in.
Republicans are doubling down on trying to raise money off of an attempted terrorist attack. And while some are trying to win the terror debate by actively attacking President Obama publicly, others are making the strategic decision to keep quiet.
Peter Baker of “The New York Times” reported this weekend, quote, “A half-dozen former senior Bush officials involved in counterterrorism told me before the Christmas Day incident that for the most part, they were comfortable with Obama‘s policies, although they were reluctant to say so on the record. Some worried they would draw the ire of Cheney‘s circle if they did. They generally resent Obama‘s anti-Bush rhetoric and are unwilling to give him political cover by defending him.”
Republicans are supposed to be good at politicizing terrorism, yet here are four former senior Bush administration officials actually telling a reporter that there are things they think are keeping the public safe that they will not publicly support because of partisan politics. They won‘t let anyone know they support these policies they actually support and think are good for the country because they‘re afraid of Dick Cheney being mad at them. They told that to a reporter.
You know, keeping your name off that quote is not going to be enough to help your cause if you‘re willing to admit to being that craven.
Joining us now is “Washington Post” columnist, E.J. Dionne.
E.J., it‘s great to see you. Thank you for being here tonight.
E.J. DIONNE, WASHINGTON POST COLUMNIST: Good to be with you. Happy New Year.
MADDOW: Happy New Year.
It seems to me like there have been a lot of political missteps as people have tried to sort of politicize and capitalize off of terrorism in the wake of this Christmas Day incident. Are the people who are supposed to be good at this getting bad at this, or has the political context changed?
DIONNE: Well, you know, it‘s like a team that uses one play and does really great one season, the 2002 election, and it works great. The next season, the 2004 election, and they figure they can use the same play over and over again and not adjust it.
And I think what they ran into in the last week is the first couple days, President Obama was trying to reassure people. A lot of folks thought he looked too laid-back, wasn‘t engaged. If they had just hit him a little then and moved on, they might have gotten some mileage out of it, but instead, they sort of pushed way farther. Part of it was just over-politicization. A lot of people objected to the fundraising letter.
Some of it was just pure mendacity, the notion that Obama doesn‘t use the word “terror.” And just part of it was hypocrisy. You know, many examples where policies that President Bush pursued that Obama is pursuing suddenly became bad because Obama is pursuing the same policies and that just didn‘t work.
And so, I think they took a situation where they might have gained a little ground and at the end of it all, I think they lost ground in the last week.
MADDOW: And I think if we‘re going to sort of maintain the pseudo sports metaphor here, in terms of playing.
DIONNE: Forgive me.
MADDOW: No, I think it‘s actually appropriate because what this sort of seems like is an own goal on behalf of the Republicans. It seems like they‘ve tried to turn this into an offensive maneuver—like they always have—and it has back fired on them. They‘ve ended up scoring a goal on themselves.
And I don‘t feel though, like Democrats have made political progress with this. Democrats have been able to turn this to any offensive advantage here for them politically.
Are Democrats playing this same game with Republicans? Or are they just letting Republicans hurt themselves?
DIONNE: Well, the old line that if your enemy is losing a battle, don‘t interfere. And I actually think that there was a moment when it turned and that moment was when Dick Cheney came out and said the things that he said that were untrue and there is, I don‘t think, anyone better at mobilizing the Democratic base than Dick Cheney.
You found all sorts of people who had been critical of President Obama on the health care plan or on Afghanistan suddenly wanting to say, hold on a minute. Dick Cheney is going after Obama on something in, you know, what was, clearly, an unfair way. And so, I think this helped Obama immensely with his own base. I‘m not sure it mattered to a lot of other people, but it sure mattered with his own side.
MADDOW: What‘s your reaction to these anonymous, former Bush senior officials telling “The New York Times” that they support President Obama‘s counterterrorism policies but they won‘t say so publicly? To me, that seems like a relatively craven admission.
DIONNE: Well, I also liked in that Peter Baker article that some of them said, “If we supported Obama, it would actually make his policies more unpopular. If they said they were like President Bush‘s policies.”
You know, some of it is about how tribal and divisive we‘ve gotten on these kind of issues. Professionals used to be professionals and Republicans and Democrats could support each other, you can‘t do that now. And it‘s bad for you in the next administration.
But there are Republicans who have spoken out. I was really struck on “Meet the Press” yesterday when General Michael Hayden, former head of the CIA, and also, Michael Chertoff, who can be a fairly partisan Republican, emphasized the continuity between certain Obama policies in terms of just stopping and catching terrorists and the Bush policies.
And so, when you have the Republican professionals in this field speaking out and saying, “Hold on, you know, some of this stuff, our own side is saying isn‘t true,” they didn‘t put it that way but that was the effect of it—when I saw that I said, this game is really over.
MADDOW: Yes. E.J. Dionne, columnist for “The Washington Post”—it‘s really good to have your insight on this. Thanks very much for your time tonight.
DIONNE: Good to be with you. Thank you.
MADDOW: As Republicans arguably start to blow it on politicizing terrorism, another man bites dog as Democrats seem to be officially out-maneuvering Republicans on health reform—out-maneuvering them in terms of legislative tactics. Yes, I know these are words that you thought you would never hear. It took almost a year but Democrats do appear to be pulling it off. We have that story coming up next.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
MADDOW: If man-made islands, an indoor skiing mountain in the middle of a desert, and a billion-dollar Tiger Woods golf course complete with palaces overlooking the greens—if all of those things weren‘t enough to spear Dubai into everyone‘s mind as a place that‘s clearly compensating for something, well today, the tiny kingdom unveiled the tallest structure in the world.
There it is, in all of its tallness. The Burj Khalifa is a 160-story, 2,717-foot high monument to height. The official news agency of Dubai is calling it, quote, “Another unique achievement by Dubai to be added to the pages of humanity‘s modern history.”
For extra credit, can you name the structure that was the world‘s tallest manmade thing before this? Before the Burj Khalifa was unveiled? What was the tallest manmade thing in the world? Can you even guess what country it was in?
If you guessed Warren Beatty‘s little black book, you have a keen sense of topical humor but you‘re wrong. Up until now, the tallest structure in the world was this television transmission tower three miles west of Blanchard, North Dakota. And it transmits the heck out of Channel 11 in Fargo. The KVLY-TV mast northwest of Fargo is now the second tallest manmade structure on earth. That is until Fargo figures out how to one up Dubai over this whole Burj Khalifa thing.
I‘m sure Fargo‘s got something in the works. I love rivalries like this. Fargo, Dubai, Fargo, Dubai.
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MADDOW: If you used whatever vacation time you had over the past few weeks to get away from the relentless debate in the Senate about health care reform, I‘m sorry to tell you vacation is over. The House and the Senate are gearing back up for yet another round on health reform. But according to new reporting today, the Democrats may have found a way to get this bill done, despite the full court press by the Republican Party to try to stop it.
On December 1st, you might remember that Republican Senator Judd Gregg wrote a memo laying out all of the procedural road blocks available to the Republican Party to try to stop health reform, a veritable arsenal of obstruction. TPM posted it all online.
Republicans, it turns out, have used a lot of these techniques.
There‘s this one, for example, from section one, the “new legislative day.” We asked a senior Democratic leadership aide about this today who confirmed to us that, yes, basically, every time you saw 92-year-old Senator Robert Byrd being wheeled into the Senate in the middle of the night, Republicans were using the “new legislative day” tactic as the reason for that.
Then in section two of Judd Gregg‘s how-to-obstruct memo, there was this one: reading of amendments and conference reports in entirety. Remember when Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma tried that one? He forced a tag team of Senate clerks to spend a whole bunch of hours reading an amendment before Bernie Sanders let rip a righteous howl on the Senate floor to put an end to that one?
Senator Gregg‘s obstruction instructions also suggested using Senate points of order to slow things down saying, quote, “A senator may make a point of order at any point he or she believes that a Senate procedure is being violated with or without cause.” We saw that trick pulled out of the bag a few times, including when Senator John Ensign of Nevada unwisely decided to deride health reform as unconstitutional by waxing eloquent about how solemnly he takes his oaths—which was awkward for a married man undergoing an ethics investigation for shtooping his campaign staffer.
Then there was the “motion to recommit” gambit. That‘s where you try to send a bill back to committee asking for changes or additions. That was a tactic the GOP used repeatedly.
But, of course, despite all of these tactics, health reform did pass the Senate. So now the fight‘s over, right? We can retire Senator Judd Gregg‘s version of “The Art of War”? It turns out, no. We can‘t.
Republicans have one last hope, one last arrow in the quiver, one last section in the obstruction memo. It‘s the conference committee process where the House and the Senate reconcile their two different versions of the bill. And according to Sun Tzu, obstruction master of the Republican Party, Senator Judd Gregg, that conference committee process provides yet more opportunities to stall this thing.
Did you know it takes three more votes just to send a bill to the conference committee? Just think what the minority party could do with three more votes. Three more chances to slow this thing down, to slow it down enough to try to kill it yet again.
Well, according to new reporting today, Republicans are not likely to get that chance. As my next guest was first to report today, Democrats are planning to skip the whole conference committee thing and work out the differences between the House and Senate bills informally, which—yes, means they‘ll be working them out without the Republicans.
Jonathan Cohn, senior editor of “The New Republic” and author of “Sick,” is the man who broke the story today.
Mr. Cohn, thank you very much for being here.
JONATHAN COHN, THE NEW REPUBLIC: It‘s good to be here. Thanks for having me.
MADDOW: In your reporting today, you wrote that a Senate staffer had told you it‘s time for a little ping pong. Ping pong being the legislative alternative to the conference committee.
What does it really mean?
COHN: Well, ping pong is basically a reference to the fact that instead of having a group of senators meet and work out a final version of the bill and then have each chamber vote on it, basically, you have—the House will now basically take the bill that the Senate passed, say, “All right, this is our starting template. Let‘s see what we like about this and let‘s modify it a little bit to make us so we can be happy with it.” They pass it. And then they send it back to the Senate and then the Senate does the same thing. Ping pong.
But, of course, as this is all happening, there is an informal negotiation going on. And in effect, the discussions that are taking the place of the conference committee and that‘ll be the Democratic leaders, will be, you know, Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid and will be the main committee players and perhaps some other people, and they will be having the discussions how to work out, “OK, how do we come to agreement on this, so as you said we can finally be done with this and we can finally get a bill onto President Obama‘s desk?”
MADDOW: Is it true that by doing things this way, rather than through a formal conference committee, Democrats are effectively denying Republicans further opportunity to slow down, obstruct, or maybe even stop the bill?
COHN: Well, there will still be a few opportunities. There has to be a final vote by the Senate, and as we‘ve seen, the Republicans will take any opportunity they can in the Senate to try to gum up the works. But this greatly diminishes the opportunities.
As you said, if we were going to go through the formal conference process, there would have to be a whole set of votes and a whole set of debates, and this thing could drag out for much, much longer. And, you know, it‘s fine, you know, to have this process of a conference committee and go through this formality if you‘re working with a minority party that‘s sincerely interested in trying to negotiate and come up with a compromise that, you know, some of their members can like. But I think we‘ve seen by now that that‘s simply not what the Republican Party is interested in.
You know, the time to cooperate, the time to talk about how to find some compromise that everyone can live with, you know, we had that time. We had the entire year to do that. And the Republicans made very clear that they were not interested.
So, I think, the Democrats now have gotten that lesson and they‘re reacting accordingly saying, “All right. You don‘t want to be part of this? We‘ll just take care of business on our own and we‘ll get this done and we‘ll try to come up with the best bill that we can.”
MADDOW: I guess the opportunity cost here is the prospect that the conference committee could actually be a chance to make the bill better, that it could be a place to constructively work out any kinks in the bill, to try to smooth out any policy awkwardnesses before it‘s actually signed by the president. I guess by having to do things this way or by choosing to do things this way—depending how you look at it—you do miss the opportunity to actually, in conference, make the policy, a better policy for the country.
COHN: Well, sure. I mean, look, in an ideal world, I‘m sure there are some ideas from the Republican side that would be useful to have as part of this discussion. And, frankly, I think Democrats over the last few months, even with the Republicans being relatively obstructionist about this, have actually made a lot of efforts to accommodate Republican concerns.
But look, at the end of the day, you need two to tango here. And if the Republicans aren‘t going to make themselves available in a constructive way, there is really no alternative but to proceed without them. I do think there‘s probably some opportunity cost there but, you know, you have to weigh that against the benefit, which is we can finally get this done. And I think that‘s the most important goal here.
MADDOW: And I think that any argument about that, and we have seen Republicans—particularly Republicans like John McCain—complaining loudly about Republicans being kept out of the process. But when they go so far as to put in black and white, to put in writing all of the different ways they‘re going to try to procedurally obstruct any form of health reform from going through, it becomes hard to also argue that they want to have a constructive role in the process. I guess they‘ve sort of ceded that territory, politically.
COHN: Well, I think so. I mean, don‘t forget on Christmas Eve, when we had that final, you know, climactic vote in the Senate and everyone was so exhausted, the last thing we heard from the Republicans was Mitch McConnell giving a speech on the floor vowing to fight on. “We‘re not going to let this bill happen. We‘re going to keep resisting.”
You know, frankly I think if Democrats were still trying to get the Republicans to cooperate and still bending over backwards, there‘ll be something wrong with them.
I mean, look, the Republicans have made their point. They don‘t want to be part of this discussion. That‘s their right. Let‘s move on without them.
MADDOW: Jonathan Cohn, senior editor at “The New Republic” - all cross the country right now, people are shell-shocked by the concept that Democrats are just taking the ball and running with it and trying to score. This is a new idea for liberals. I think it‘s just starting to sink in.
Thanks a lot, Jonathan.
COHN: Thanks for having me.
MADDOW: There is news brewing in the political blogosphere tonight about a Palin, a Palin who is not Sarah Palin. We will get to the bottom of it next.
And stay tuned for a full-on review of the constitutional provision that Michele Bachmann says is surely out to get you. Or at least she used to say it was surely out to get you. Now, she‘s not so sure. It‘s an interesting, backsliding story. Stick around.
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MADDOW: Still ahead, if you are a Republican member of Congress who has a deep-seated fear of the census, but you also rely on the census for the very existence of your job, 2010 could be a very complicated year for you. TMI on Michele Bachmann and the census she fears, ahead.
But first, a few holy mackerel stories in today‘s news.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
HILLARY CLINTON, UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE: The instability in Yemen is a threat to regional stability and even global stability.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
MADDOW: That was Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, speaking earlier today. The head of Cent Com, Gen. David Petraeus, took a surprise visit to Yemen this weekend. It was his third trip to Yemen in the 14 months that he has been the head of Cent Com.
Gen. Petraeus met with Yemen‘s president for about an hour and a half on Saturday. And then, the very next day on Sunday, the United States shut down our embassy in Yemen citing security threats. So did the Brits.
Today, the French, the Germans, the Japanese and the Czechs all followed suit, all either closing their embassies in that country entirely or limiting access to them.
Meanwhile, Andrea Mitchell reported on “Nightly News” tonight that truck-fuls of explosives are said to have gone missing somewhere inside Yemen, which may of course be why everything just got so suddenly shut down. We will keep you posted.
While we are talking about things going wrong in important places, political instability remains the huge story of Iran, a vast, growing, and powerful protest movement that has continued long beyond the summer‘s botched election. Government crackdowns have led to mass arrests, violence, and censorship.
Politically speaking, it is therefore incumbent upon the Iranian regime to at least try to appear unfazed, unified, and gaff-free in the face of this strong and growing opposition.
Now, you can cue the inadvertently hilarious new year‘s related government face plant. It is standard operating procedure for Iran‘s soccer league to send out a new year‘s greeting to all the members of the International Soccer Federation, FIFA.
This year was no different. The message was E-mailed out to everyone including, accidentally, a country whose existence Iran does not officially recognize - Israel, a soccer team that refuses to play in competition. A country its president has made quite a name for himself by insulting, dismissing, and denouncing.
So the message was essentially, “Happy New Year to everybody including soccer team of the country we refuse to admit exists.”
For this grave crime of accidentally forgetting to exclude Israel from the generic international New Year‘s greeting, accidentally including Israel in the happy new year, a senior official from the Iranian Soccer Federation has already offered his resignation.
According to the BBC, for their part, Israel took it all in stride. Quote, “They decided to make the most of it and replied with similar good wishes to, in their words, ‘all the good people of Iran‘ and ending the message with an E-mail wink. So Israeli soccer winning this round of word war three with cunningly deployed emoticons.
And finally, a story that has been percolating on blogs and throughout the Internet today - it has all the trappings of a monumental blockbuster of an Internet scoop. So one of our producers spent all day today looking into it and I have some very important information to share with you about a Palin.
Now, back in September, someone in Alaska filed paperwork to establish themselves as the organizer of a new limited liability company, an LLC. That person was Bristol Palin - 19-year-old Bristol Palin, the daughter of Sarah and Todd Palin, the mother of Tripp, now in the news for something completely un-tabloid-y.
The particular type of LLC that Bristol Palin established uses the federal classification code 541820 which means that Ms. Palin the younger has just formed a company that intends to provide lobbying, public relations, and political consulting services.
This is why it seemed like the real deal. First the lawyer named as the registering agent of this LLC is Thomas Van Flein who practices law at the address listed here on this document that we‘ve blurred out for the sake of his privacy.
Mr. Van Flein‘s previous gig was representing Gov. Sarah Palin during the trooper-gate scandal. Also, this also seemed like it was real, right? The registered company is called BSMP - BSMP - ah, the initials of Bristol Sharon Marie Palin.
Also, and although this is not real evidence, but it is neat, the signature on the document and Levi Johnston‘s ring tattoo of Bristol Palin‘s signature look a lot alike.
So adding all of this up, it seems like what you‘ve ended up with here is Bristol Palin, political consultant, lobbyist and public relations executive at the age of 19. Go, Bristol, go, right?
Actually, no. Mr. Van Flein finally got back to us late this evening. He told us in an E-mail, quote, “The code for BSMP, LLC pertains to several areas but includes public relations. Bristol Palin provides public relations services and is currently an ambassador for the Candie‘s Foundation.
The Candie‘s Foundation is a pro-abstinence organization. Bristol Palin has essentially set herself up to be paid as an incorporated entity as opposed to being paid as an individual and that‘s sort of a common choice people make when they have money coming in from various sources like this.
So BSMP, LLC, may just be a pretty smart financial decision by a very astute 19-year-old, or Bristol Palin is about to launch a lobbying and consultancy firm to run her mom‘s 2012 presidential campaign. Theoretically possible, but probably not.
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MADDOW: As the Republican Party searches for meaning in the political minority, one of its newest members is of course Alabama Congressman Parker Griffith who announced last month he was leaving the Democratic Party and becoming a Republican.
When he made that announcement, Mr. Griffith‘s campaign consulting team announced right away that they would be dropping Mr. Griffith because of his defection to the Republican Party.
Today, saying that Congressman Griffith had made a mistake, his chief-of-staff resigned as well, as did his legislative director and his legislative assistant and his other legislative assistant and his press secretary and his staff assistant and his legislative correspondent and his other legislative correspondent and his congressional fellow and his other congressional fellow. And even his intern quit.
Shout out to you, Andrew Menafee(ph). The entire Parker Griffith staff even waited until after the winter break so they could come back to Washington and do this en masse resignation in person and to release their “you made a big mistake” statement about their former employer.
And Mr. Griffith may have many, many virtues as a congressman and employer. Who knows, but inspiring confidence in those closest to him does not appear to be one of those virtues.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
MADDOW: First, Michele Bachmann encouraged everyone not to participate in the census. It‘s a conspiracy. Now, Michele Bachmann has changed her tune. If anything requires TMI, this story does. It‘s next. Stay with us.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
MADDOW: The secretary of commerce, the mayor of New York, and the director of the United States Census were all together in Times Square today to kick off a big, nationwide ad campaign.
This ad campaign includes a 13-vehicle bus tour traveling more than 150,000 miles, stopping at the Super Bowl in Miami, Mardi Gras in New Orleans, and even, I guess, bus-boating it somehow to Puerto Rico. The goal is to persuade Americans to fill out the census form, the form that should arrive in a mail box near you in mid-March.
The government is planning on spending over $300 million this year to persuade us all to spend 10 minutes answering that questionnaire and sending it back. The patriotic case for participating in the census is being made slightly more difficult this year by conservative Fringy McFringersons among us deciding that this year - even though it happens every 10 years, this year, the census must be some sort of commu-bamanist plot. For help unraveling this we turn to Kent Jones and TMI.
(MUSIC)
Oh, a special report.
KENT JONES, MSNBC CORRESPONDENT: Oh.
MADDOW: Oh. Kent, so tell me, how is it that once in a decade - fill out the census campaign, happens every decade. This year, they have to cope with conspiracy theories about the census, too.
JONES: That‘s right. Two magic words - Michele Bachmann.
MADDOW: Oh, yes.
JONES: Have a look.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
(voice-over): The congresswoman from the sixth district of Minnesota is drawing a line about the 2010 census.
REP. MICHELE BACHMANN (R-MN): I‘m not encouraging Americans not to fill out the census. I‘m saying for myself and for my family, our comfort level is we will comply with the Constitution, Article I, Section 2, we will give the number of the people in our home, and that‘s where we‘re going to draw the line.
JONES: Don‘t tread on me with your counting the people in my household.
BACHMANN: How do we know that our information that‘s given to the government, personal information, will stay private? What guarantees do the American people have that hackers won‘t get into the system?
JONES: You know what TMI means? Too much information, and that goes for your snoopy neighbors too.
BACHMANN: They‘ll go to our neighbors on our left and on our right and ask our neighbors to give them information about our personal lives. This is very concerning.
JONES: Actually, this is the census, which happens every 10 years, at least until Michele Bachmann can stop it.
BACHMANN: Look at American history. Between 1942 and 1947 the data that was collected by the Census Bureau was handed over to the FBI and other organizations at the request of President Roosevelt.
And that‘s how the Japanese were rounded up and put into the internment camps. I‘m not saying that that‘s what the administration is planning to do. But I am saying that the private personal information that was given to the census bureau in the 1940s was used it against Americans to round them up.
JONES: Whew! So what kind of deranged extremists would want to do that to its own people? Who came up with this flagrant insult to the Constitution? The guys who wrote the Constitution.
Back in 1787, the United States became the first nation to make a census mandatory in its constitution, quote, “The actual enumeration of the population shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress and within every subsequent term of 10 years.”
It‘s data from that 10-year census that‘s used to redraw congressional maps - congressional maps like in Minnesota, which is facing the possible loss of a congressional seat after the next census.
Maybe that‘s why we haven‘t heard Bachmann railing about hackers or snoopy neighbors or interment camps since at least last August. Because if Michele Bachmann doesn‘t fill out the census and her constituents don‘t fill out their census, then what happens to her district? I think she‘s figuring out.
BACHMANN: The census is the mother load of all data collection in the United States.
JONES: Moral? Be nice to your mother lode.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
MADDOW: Thank you, very much, Kent. I appreciate that. A brand-new segment is premiering on “COUNTDOWN” tonight. Keith‘s quick comment on Dick Cheney versus President Obama.
But first is to catch a senator. John Ensign on camera asked about the ethics investigation into him shtupping his staffer and paying her off and getting her husband hired as a lobbyist. That‘s next. Stay with us.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
MADDOW: Tonight‘s “Cocktail Moment” is all about the secretive religious organization known as The Family about which we‘ve reported quite a bit on this show.
First up, former C Street denizen and Family member, Sen. John Ensign of Nevada. Since his June 16th confessional, awkwardly in front of a public restroom sign, he has been particularly adept at avoiding the media when it comes to questions about his extramarital affair with a staffer and about the investigations into his professional relationship with her husband, former aide-turned-lobbyist, Doug Hampton.
In fact, the first time we remember seeing Sen. Ensign actually having to respond to anyone on camera about Mr. Hampton was when CNN‘s Dana Bash and a producer attached themselves to Sen. Ensign outside on Capitol Hill.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DANA BASH, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Senator, why was it so important to get Doug Hampton those jobs?
SEN. JOHN ENSIGN (R-NV): Just look at our state. Just look at our state. He‘s very clear on that stuff.
BASH: Is there any chance that you - are you considering resigning?
ENSIGN: I am focused on doing my work, and I am going to continue to focus on doing my work.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
MADDOW: Since that, Mr. Hampton has said in interviews that Sen. Ensign knowingly violated ethics rules by helping him get lobbying clients and meetings less than a year after he left the senator‘s employ.
So when CNN‘s Rick Sanchez got the chance to interview Sen. Ensign at the end of the year, the anchor gamely tried to get some kind of explanation from Mr. Ensign, only to be evaded for a full six minutes.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
ENSIGN: You know, Rick, I‘ve been dealing with health care reform.
My state has over 12 percent unemployment rate. We have two wars going on.
RICK SANCHEZ, CNN ANCHOR: Right.
ENSIGN: These latest terrorist attacks - there are so many other bigger issues. I‘ve commented on all I needed to comment on those kinds of things. I‘ve commented on all I was going to comment on that.
I‘m not going to answer any of the questions because I‘m focused on doing my job right now. All that stuff will take care of itself over time. I‘ve spoken all that I need to speak on this.
And everything will take care of itself over time. I‘ve answered all of those questions. In the end, everything will be answered in its fullest. We will cooperate, and I think, you know, based on the facts, that the evidence committee would clear me, and I‘ll be able to go on being a senator. I‘ve answered the questions that I‘m going to answer, and I go back to my statements ...
SANCHEZ: All right.
ENSIGN: ... that I have done nothing ethically or illegal in this matter. And in the end, it‘s going to absolutely - we feel that we will be completely exonerated.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
MADDOW: What we, senator? You know, speaking of The Family, the “New York Times” today picked up on the reporting we‘ve done, for the last five weeks or so, on the kill-the-gays bill proposed in Uganda.
As we have reported, the legislator who introduced the kill-the-gays bill and the country‘s president whose government has supported it are members of The Family.
Three weeks ago, we finally found out what the extremely secretive and media-averse Family thinks of the bill in Uganda.
Bob Hunter, a former Ford and Carter administration official, who‘s also been one of the Family‘s key contacts with Uganda, told investigative reporter, Jeff Sharlet, that The Family is opposed to that bill.
And not only that, Mr. Hunter said he‘s actively working to get U.S. politicians to actively fight against the bill. For the first time since we started reporting on The Family many, many months ago, we finally have been able to schedule an interview with someone who is a part of the group.
Mr. Bob Hunter is the interview on THE RACHEL MADDOW Show right here tomorrow night which happens at our regular time, which is 9:00 p.m. Eastern. We are really, really, really looking forward to having him on the show. It is long overdue.
We will see you tomorrow for that. In the meantime, “COUNTDOWN” with Keith Olbermann starts right now. Have a great night.
Monday, January 4, 2010
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Transcript for The Rachel Maddow Show, January 4, 2010 |
Friday, October 16, 2009
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$400 Per Gallon Gas To Drive Debate Over Cost Of War In Afghanistan |
The Hill reports:
The Pentagon pays an average of $400 to put a gallon of fuel into a combat vehicle or aircraft in Afghanistan.
The statistic is likely to play into the escalating debate in Congress over the cost of a war that entered its ninth year last week.
Pentagon officials have told the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee a gallon of fuel costs the military about $400 by the time it arrives in the remote locations in Afghanistan where U.S. troops operate.
“It is a number that we were not aware of and it is worrisome,” Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.), the chairman of the House Appropriations Defense panel, said in an interview with The Hill. “When I heard that figure from the Defense Department, we started looking into it.”
The Pentagon comptroller’s office provided the fuel statistic to the committee staff when it was asked for a breakdown of why every 1,000 troops deployed to Afghanistan costs $1 billion. The Obama administration uses this estimate in calculating the cost of sending more troops to Afghanistan.
The Obama administration is engaged in an internal debate over its future strategy in Afghanistan. Part of this debate concerns whether to increase the number of U.S. troops in that country.
The top U.S. general in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal, reportedly has requested that about 40,000 additional troops be sent.
Democrats in Congress are divided over whether to send more combat troops to stabilize Afghanistan in the face of waning public support for the war.
Any additional troops and operations likely will have to be paid for through a supplemental spending bill next year, something Murtha has said he already anticipates.
Afghanistan — with its lack of infrastructure, challenging geography and increased roadside bomb attacks — is a logistical nightmare for the U.S. military, according to congressional sources, and it is expensive to transport fuel and other supplies.
A landlocked country, Afghanistan has no seaports and a shortage of airports and navigable roads. The nearest port is in Karachi, Pakistan, where fuel for U.S. troops is shipped.
From there, commercial trucks transport the fuel through Pakistan and Afghanistan, sometimes changing carriers. Fuel is then transferred to storage locations in Afghanistan for movement within the country. Military transport is used to distribute fuel to forward operating bases. For many remote locations, this means fuel supplies must be provided by air.
One of the most expensive ways to supply fuel is by transporting it in bladders carried by helicopter; the amount that can be flown at one time can barely satisfy the need for fuel.
The cheapest way to transport fuel is usually by ship. Other reasonable methods to provide fuel are by rail and pipeline. The prices go up exponentially when aircraft are used, according to congressional sources.
The $400 per gallon reflects what in Pentagon parlance is known as the “fully burdened cost of fuel.”
“The fully burdened cost of fuel is a recognition that there are a lot of other factors that come into play,” said Mark Iden, the deputy director of operations at the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), which provides fuel and energy to all U.S. military services worldwide.
The DESC provides one gallon of JP8 fuel, which is used for both aircraft and ground vehicles, at a standard price of $2.78, said Iden.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James Conway, told a Navy Energy Forum this week that transporting fuel miles into Afghanistan and Iraq along risky and dangerous routes can raise the cost of a $1.04 gallon up to $400, according to Aviation Week which covered the forum.
“These are fairly major problems for us,” Conway said, according to the publication.
The fully burdened cost of fuel accounts for the cost of transporting it to where it is needed, said Kevin Geiss, program director for energy security in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment.
And moving fuel by convoy or even airlift is expensive, according to the Army news release from July 16, which quoted Geiss. In some places, Geiss said, analysts have estimated the fully burdened cost of fuel might even be as high as $1,000 per gallon.
Energy consumed by a combat vehicle may not even be for actual mobility of the vehicle, Geiss said, but instead to run the systems onboard the vehicle, including the communications equipment and the cooling systems to protect the electronics onboard.
Some 8o percent of U.S. military casualties in Afghanistan are due to improvised explosive devices, many of which are placed in the path of supply convoys — making it even more imperative to use aircraft for transportation.
According to a Government Accountability Office report published earlier this year, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost due to attacks or other events while delivering fuel to Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan in June 2008 alone.
High fuel demand, coupled with the volatility of fuel prices, also have significant implications for the Department of Defense’s operating costs, the GAO said. The fully burdened cost of fuel — that is, the total ownership cost of buying, moving and protecting fuel in systems during combat — has been reported to be many times higher than the price of a gallon of fuel itself, according to the report.
The Marines in Afghanistan, for example, reportedly run through some 800,000 gallons of fuel a day. That reflects the logistical challenges of running the counterinsurgency operations but also the need for fuel during the extreme weather conditions in Afghanistan — hot summers and freezing winters.
With the military boosting the number of the all-terrain-mine resistant ambush-protected vehicles (M-ATVs) in Afghanistan meant to survive roadside bombs, the fuel consumption will likely rise even higher, since those vehicles are considered gas-guzzlers.
The Pentagon comptroller’s office did not return requests for comment by press time.
| [+/-] |
Stanley McChrystal's Long War |
The NY Times reports:
Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal stepped off the whirring Black Hawk and headed straight into town. He had come to Garmsir, a dusty outpost along the Helmand River in southern Afghanistan, to size up the war that President Obama has asked him to save. McChrystal pulled off his flak jacket and helmet. His face, skeletal and austere, seemed a piece of the desert itself.
He was surrounded by a clutch of bodyguards, normal for a four-star general, and an array of the Marine officers charged with overseeing the town. Garmsir had been under Taliban control until May 2008, when a force of American Marines swept in and cleared it. Since then, the British, then the Americans, have been holding it and trying, ever so slowly, to build something in Garmsir — a government, an army, a police force — for the first time since the war began more than eight years ago.
The Marines around McChrystal, including the local battalion commander, Lt. Col. Christian Cabaniss, looked surprised, even alarmed, when McChrystal removed his protective gear. But as the group walked the rutted streets into Garmsir’s bazaar, they began taking off their helmets, too.
“Who owns the land here?” McChrystal asked, peering up the street and into the shops. “Is it owned by the farmers or by landlords?”
It was the sort of question a sociologist, or an economist, would ask. No one offered an answer.
“If you owned 200 acres here, would you live on it, or would you live somewhere else?” McChrystal asked.
The entourage entered the bazaar. The Afghans sensed that an important American had arrived, and they began to gather in groups inside the stalls. Then the general stopped and turned.
“What do you need here?” McChrystal asked.
A translator turned the general’s words into Pashto.
“We need schools!” one Afghan called back. “Schools!”
“We’re working on that,” McChrystal said. “Those things take time.”
McChrystal walked some more, engaging another group of Afghans. He posed the same question.
“Security,” a man said. “We need security. Security first, then the other things will be possible.”
“That is what we are trying to do,” McChrystal said. “But it’s going to take time. Success takes time.”
The questions kept coming, and the answer was the same. After a couple of hours, McChrystal put on his helmet and flak jacket, boarded the Black Hawk and flew to another town.
Success takes time, but how much time does Stanley McChrystal have? The war in Afghanistan is now in its ninth year. The Taliban, measured by the number of their attacks, are stronger than at any time since the Americans toppled their government at the end of 2001. American soldiers and Marines are dying at a faster rate than ever before. Polls in the United States show that opposition to the war is growing steadily.
Worse yet, for all of America’s time in Afghanistan — for all the money and all the blood — the lack of accomplishment is manifest wherever you go. In Garmsir, there is nothing remotely resembling a modern state that could take over if America and its NATO allies left. Tour the country with a general, and you will see very quickly how vast and forbidding this country is and how paltry the effort has been.
And finally, there is the government in Kabul. President Hamid Karzai, once the darling of the West, rose to the top of nationwide elections in August on what appears to be a tide of fraud. The Americans and their NATO allies are confronting the possibility that the government they are supporting, building and defending is a rotten shell.
In his initial assessment of the country, sent to President Obama early last month, McChrystal described an Afghanistan on the brink of collapse and an America at the edge of defeat. To reverse the course of the war, McChrystal presented President Obama with what could be the most momentous foreign-policy decision of his presidency: escalate or fail. McChrystal has reportedly asked for 40,000 additional American troops — there are 65,000 already here — and an accelerated effort to train Afghan troops and police and build an Afghan state. If President Obama can’t bring himself to step up the fight, McChrystal suggested, then he might as well give up.
“Inadequate resources,” McChrystal wrote, “will likely result in failure.”
The magnitude of the choice presented by McChrystal, and now facing President Obama, is difficult to overstate. For what McChrystal is proposing is not a temporary, Iraq-style surge — a rapid influx of American troops followed by a withdrawal. McChrystal’s plan is a blueprint for an extensive American commitment to build a modern state in Afghanistan, where one has never existed, and to bring order to a place famous for the empires it has exhausted. Even under the best of circumstances, this effort would most likely last many more years, cost hundreds of billions of dollars and entail the deaths of many more American women and men.
And that’s if it succeeds.
A few days after McChrystal filed his report, I sat down with him in his headquarters in Kabul. He seemed upbeat and relaxed. The report was still secret — it hadn’t yet leaked to the public. The ensuing furor was still to come, as was talk that McChrystal was considering resigning, which he was forced to publicly dispel. The atmosphere was not tense — not yet. Only urgent.
“I took this job because I was asked to take it, and because it is very, very important,” McChrystal told me. “Admiral Mullen” — head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — “specifically said to me: ‘You go out, you decide what needs to be done, and you tell me whatever you need to do that. Don’t constrain yourself because of politics. You tell me what you need.’ ”
I asked him about Obama.
“I didn’t get any assurances from anyone that I would be given any amount of time,” McChrystal said. “I didn’t get any assurances from anyone that I would be given any amount of resources. I didn’t ask for any assurances.”
For a moment, McChrystal paused.
“I don’t feel like the lonely man in the arena,” he said, “with all the pressure on my shoulders.”
II.
THE MARINES WERE walking along the sandy road when the Afghans lined up to watch the bomb.
The Marines, members of Echo Company of the Second Battalion, Eighth Marine Regiment, had plodded through a mile of sodden cornfields in the heat of Helmand Province and climbed a rock promontory to an observation post once manned by soldiers of the Soviet Union. They arrived in early July as part of the big push ordered by President Obama; General McChrystal had visited their command post in Garmsir, 12 miles up the road, three days before.
The Marines had been in plain view for more than two hours. And when they moved down from the old Soviet lookout and walked up the dirt path that runs alongside the hamlet of Mian Poshteh, the Afghans started to come out.
At first, a lone man walked along the edge of one of Mian Poshteh’s mud-brick houses. Then he stopped and turned and stood, watching. Then another man, this one in an irrigation ditch, stuck his head up over the ledge. A pair of children stopped playing. They turned to watch.
“Something’s going down,” Sgt. Jonathan Delgado said. He was 22 and from Kissimmee, Fla.
“Watch that guy,” said Lance Cpl. Joshua Vance, pointing. He was also 22, from Raleigh, N.C.
Two more Afghans arrived. They stopped and stood and looked at a spot just ahead of the Marines. A man on a motorcycle drove past, driving slowly, turning his head. Then the bomb went off. It had been buried in the path itself, a few feet under the sand, a few feet in front of the Marines.
The blast from the bomb was sharp and deep, and a dirty cloud shot up a hundred feet. Waves from the blast shot out, toward the village and toward us. Ten Marines at the front of the line disappeared.
“We’re hit! We’re hit!” Delgado shouted, and everyone ran to the front.
Marines began staggering out of the cloud. They were holding their ears and eyes.
“God, I’m still here,” Cpl. Matt Kaiser said, rubbing his ears. Kaiser had been at the front, sweeping the ground with a mine detector. He was from Oak Harbor, Ohio. “I’m still here.”
“No one’s hit,” Delgado said. “Jesus, no one’s hit.”
The rest of the young men staggered out of the cloud while the Marines trained their guns on Mian Poshteh.
The Afghans were gone.
“My bell’s rung pretty bad,” Kaiser said. He was shaking his head and glancing up and down and half laughing.
The bomber had missed. The weapon had been what the Marines refer to as “command-detonated,” which meant that someone, probably in Mian Poshteh, had punched a trigger — on a wire leading to the bomb — when the Marines came up the path. The triggerman needed to remember precisely where he had buried his bomb. Clearly, he had forgotten. If he had waited five more seconds, he would have killed several Marines.
Delgado, Kaiser and the others gathered themselves and walked toward Mian Poshteh. On their radio, the Marines could hear voices coming from inside the village.
“Is everything ready?” a voice said in Pashto.
“Everything is ready,” another voice said. “Let’s see what they do.”
The Marines stayed back. Earlier in the war, they would have gone into Mian Poshteh; they would have surrounded the village and kicked in doors until they found the bomber. Most likely they would have found him — and maybe along the way they would have killed some civilians and smashed up some homes. And made a lot of enemies. The Marines are a very different force now, with very different goals. They walked to within 50 feet of Mian Poshteh, and Lt. Patrick Bragan shouted: “Send us five men. Five men.”
Minutes passed, and five Afghans appeared. They were unarmed and ordinary looking.
“I have no idea who did that,” an old man named Fazul Mohammed said.
“Maybe they came at night,” a man named Assadullah said.
“I only heard the explosion,” a man named Syed Wali said.
The face of Lieutenant Bragan was pink from the heat and from pleading.
“All you have to do is tell us,” he said. “We’re here to help you.”
The Marines gave up. Near sunset, they started back the way they came, through the head-high corn. Delgado turned to one of his buddies, Cpl. John Shymanik, 22.
“They didn’t get us today,” Delgado said.
“They’re still trying, though,” Shymanik said.
III.
STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL SAT at the head of a U-shaped bank of tables in a sealed room at Bagram Airfield, a main hub of the war. He was surrounded by five giant video screens. On each screen was another general — American, German, Dutch, French, Italian — each commanding a different part of Afghanistan. It was McChrystal’s morning briefing, known as the commander’s update.
One by one, the generals scrolled through the events from the day before: a roadside bomb in Khost, small-arms fire in Ghazni, a British soldier killed in Helmand Province. Then one of the European generals started talking about an airstrike. A group of Taliban insurgents had attacked a coalition convoy, and the soldiers called for air support. A Hellfire missile, the European general said, obliterated an Afghan compound. The general — he cannot be named because of the confidentiality of the meeting — was moving on to the next topic when McChrystal stopped him.
“Can you come back to that, please?” McChrystal said.
McChrystal’s voice is higher than you would expect for a four-star general.
“Yes, sir,” the European general said.
“We just struck a compound,” McChrystal said. “I would like for you to explain to me the process you used to shoot a Hellfire missile into a compound that might have had civilians in it.”
The European commander looked at an aide and muttered something. The killing of Afghan civilians, usually caused by inadvertent American and NATO airstrikes, has become the most sensitive issue between the Afghans and their Western guests. Each time civilians are killed, the Taliban launch a campaign of very public propaganda.
“Were there civilians in that compound?” McChrystal asked. He was leaning into the microphone on the table.
The commander started to talk, but McChrystal kept going.
“Who made that decision?” McChrystal said.
An aide handed the European general a sheaf of papers.
“I’m sorry, but the system is not responsive enough for us to get that kind of information that quickly,” the general said.
McChrystal’s face began to tighten. Generals tend to treat one another with the utmost deference.
“We bomb a compound, and I don’t know about it until the next morning?” McChrystal said. “Don’t just tell me, ‘Yeah, it’s O.K.’ I want to know about it. I’m being a hard-ass about it.”
The European general looked down at his papers.
“It seems it was not a Hellfire missile but a 500-pound bomb,” he said.
McChrystal took off his reading glasses and looked around the room — at the video screens and the other American officers.
“Gentlemen, we need to understand the implications of what we are doing,” he said. “Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction. A guy with a long-barrel rifle runs into a compound, and we drop a 500-pound bomb on it? Civilian casualties are not just some reality with the Washington press. They are a reality for the Afghan people. If we use airpower irresponsibly, we can lose this fight.”
IV.
LATER THAT DAY, during a drive through Kabul, McChrystal told me that he had decided to drastically restrict the circumstances under which airstrikes would be permitted: for all practical purposes, he was banning bombs and missiles in populated areas unless his men were in danger of being overrun.
“Even if it means we are going to step away from a firefight and fight them another day, that’s O.K.,” McChrystal told me.
McChrystal’s missive was the first in an array he has drafted aimed at radically transforming the way America and its allies wage war here. In his first weeks on the job, McChrystal issued directives instructing his men on how to comport themselves with Afghans (“Think of how you would expect a foreign army to operate in your neighborhood, among your families and your children, and act accordingly”); how to fight (“Think of counterinsurgency as an argument to win the support of the people”); even how to drive (“in ways that respect the safety and well-being of the Afghan people”). At the heart of McChrystal’s strategy are three principles: protect the Afghan people, build an Afghan state and make friends with whomever you can, including insurgents. Killing the Taliban is now among the least important things that are expected of NATO soldiers.
“You can kill Taliban forever,” McChrystal said, “because they are not a finite number.”
That strategy is underscored by an extraordinary sense of urgency — that eight years into this war the margin for error for the Americans has shrunk to zero. “If every soldier is authorized to make one mistake,” McChrystal said, “then we lose the war.”
While Afghanistan is not Iraq, McChrystal’s plan does resemble in some ways that of General David H. Petraeus, who took command of American forces in Iraq in early 2007, when the country was disintegrating in a civil war. For four years, the American military had tried to crush the Iraqi insurgency and got the opposite: the insurgency bloomed, and the country imploded.
By refocusing their efforts on protecting Iraqi civilians, American troops were able to cut off the insurgents from their base of support. Then the Americans struck peace deals with tens of thousands of former fighters — the phenomenon known as the Sunni Awakening — while at the same time fashioning a formidable Iraqi army. After a bloody first push, violence in Iraq dropped to its lowest levels since the war began.
“It was all in,” Petraeus told me about that time.
And so if it was Petraeus who saved Iraq from cataclysm, it now falls to McChrystal to save Afghanistan.
Petraeus and McChrystal are in fact close — their bond solidified in the crucible of Iraq. Petraeus, now head of the U.S. military’s Central Command, with overall responsibility for both Iraq and Afghanistan, pushed McChrystal for the job. “He was a key part of the team in Iraq,” Petraeus told me.
Now 55, Stanley McChrystal is the son of Herbert J. McChrystal Jr., an Army general who served in Germany during the American occupation and fought in Korea and Vietnam. Stanley McChrystal was the fourth child in a family of five boys and one girl; all of them grew up to serve in the military or marry someone who did. “My dad was always the soldier I wanted to be,” McChrystal said.
He graduated from West Point in 1976, at the Army’s post-Vietnam nadir. Over the next 30 years, McChrystal ascended the ranks, mostly by way of the elite, secretive wing of Special Operations, in units like the Rangers. He served as a staff officer and an operations officer in the first gulf war and did stints at Harvard and the Council on Foreign Relations (where he is remembered for running a dozen miles each morning to the council’s offices on the Upper East Side).
With his long and gaunt face and his long and lean body, McChrystal looks almost preternaturally alert — coiled, hungry. He pushes himself mercilessly, sleeping four or five hours a night, eating one meal a day. He runs eight miles at a clip, usually with an audiobook at his ears. “I was the fastest runner at Fort Stewart, Ga., until he arrived,” Petraeus told me recently. “He’s a tremendous athlete.” On a recent daylong helicopter trip touring bases around the country, McChrystal yawned throughout the day — the only evidence of his exhaustion. He drank regularly from a large mug of coffee, black.
As McChrystal drives himself, he sometimes affords little tolerance to those who do not.
V.
MCCHRYSTAL WAS ONLY a month into his new job when he strode into the area inside NATO’s International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul known as Destille Gardens. A collection of one-story buildings with a courtyard and patio, it is the only thing at headquarters that resembles a lounge or a recreation area. Soldiers and Marines — most of them staff officers — would gather there for coffee and even, if they were European, a glass of beer or wine. It’s a world away from Helmand Province.
McChrystal was coming for a haircut, and as he walked through the courtyard, he passed a table of coalition officers chatting and drinking. According to several officers present, his face showed immediate disapproval, but no one noticed and he kept on going. Twenty minutes later, when McChrystal walked back across the courtyard, his hair freshly trimmed, the officers were still at their table. Some of them had dozed off. The general’s mouth tightened. He walked over to their table.
He woke one officer and said: “Good afternoon, I’m Stan McChrystal. Is there a problem with your office space?”
He turned and walked off. Six weeks later, McChrystal issued an order banning alcohol from I.S.A.F. headquarters.
Yet for all his asceticism, McChrystal displays a subtlety that suggests a wider view of the world. “If you were to go into his house, he has this unreal library,” Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, McChrystal’s intelligence chief and longtime friend, told me this summer. “You can go over and touch a binding and ask him, ‘What’s that one about?’ And he’ll just start. His bad habit is wandering around old bookstores. He’s not one of these guys that just reads military books. He reads about weird things too. He’s reading a book about Shakespeare right now.”
Also on his recent reading list this past summer: “Vietnam: A History,” Stanley Karnow’s unsparing account of America’s defeat.
When McChrystal decided to come to Afghanistan, a lot of people signed up to come with him. “I first worked for him in the gulf war, and General McChrystal was the sharpest, fastest staff officer I have ever come across — and I had been serving for 20 years at that point,” said Graeme Lamb, a retired British general and former commander of the Special Air Service, Britain’s equivalent of Delta Force. “He could take ideas, concepts, directions, and he could turn them into language, into understanding, and pass it out at an electric rate.”
Lamb was getting ready to retire earlier this year when McChrystal asked him to join his team. Lamb flew to Washington to talk it over, and the two men sealed the deal at a Mexican restaurant in Arlington, Va. “I don’t think there is a Brit that could have made the same call,” Lamb told me.
One big question hovering over McChrystal is whether his experience in Iraq truly prepares him for the multiheaded challenge that faces him now. For nearly five years, McChrystal served as chief of the Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees the military’s commando units, including the Army Delta Force and the Navy Seals. (Until recently, the Pentagon refused to acknowledge that the command even existed.)
As JSOC’s commander, McChrystal spent no time trying to win over the Iraqis or training Iraqi forces or building the governing capacity of the Iraqi state. In Iraq (and, for about a third of his time, in Afghanistan), McChrystal’s job, and that of the men under his command, was, almost exclusively, to kill and capture insurgents and terrorists.
The rescue of Iraq from the cataclysm that it had become by 2006 is an epic tale of grit and blood and luck. By February of that year, Iraq had descended into a full-blown civil war, with a thousand civilians dying every month. Its central actors were the gunmen of Al Qaeda, who, with their suicide bombers, carried out large-scale massacres of Shiite civilians; and the Shiite militias, some of them in Iraqi uniforms, who retaliated by massacring thousands of young Sunni men.
Breaking the cycle of attack and revenge was crucial to stopping the civil war, and it was here, McChrystal and his colleagues say, that JSOC played a critical role. In a series of operations that climaxed in 2006 and 2007, McChrystal’s commandos set out to destroy Al Qaeda of Mesopotamia.
“The aim was to go after the middle of their network — in a regular army, their senior noncommissioned officers. We tried to cause the network to collapse,” McChrystal told me. “We took it to an art form. It really became a machine.”
McChrystal said that as early as the fall of 2006 — when Al Qaeda was at its murderous peak — it looked like the group was coming apart. “We sensed that Al Qaeda was going to implode,” he said. “We could just feel it. We were watching it and feeling it and seeing it.” In addition to driving the civil war, Al Qaeda gunmen were seen as a main obstacle to Iraq’s Sunnis’ reconciling with the Americans and the Iraqi government. By degrading Al Qaeda, McChrystal and others say, they helped significantly reduce the civil war, and by so doing created a space that allowed a broader movement of reconciliation — the Sunni Awakening — to succeed.
“What General McChrystal was doing with the forces he had under command in Iraq was absolutely essential to setting the conditions that allowed the Awakening to move forward,” Lamb, the former S.A.S. head, told me.
The most significant moment in McChrystal’s tenure was on June 6, 2006, when a crucial piece of information came across one of JSOC’s video screens. For months, according to sources involved in the operation (though not McChrystal), McChrystal and his commandos had been hunting Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian head of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Zarqawi, of course, was the man responsible for the murder of many hundreds of innocents in car bombings and suicide attacks. McChrystal was so desperate that he created a separate task force to get him. The task force narrowly missed Zarqawi several times; a few months before the June sighting, the operator of a Predator drone, a pilotless airplane, had spotted Zarqawi in a taxicab in Anbar Province. He lost him — and Zarqawi jumped out — when the operator changed the focus on the Predator’s camera lens.
This time, McChrystal believed, Zarqawi was in his sights. The tip was long in coming, a result of thousands of hours of intelligence work, but according to several sources, it boiled down to this: Under interrogation, an Iraqi insurgent who was a member of Zarqawi’s inner circle pointed to an Iraqi named Abd al-Rahman, who, the insurgent said, served as Zarqawi’s spiritual adviser. Whenever Rahman was preparing to meet Zarqawi, the source told the Americans, he would send his wife and family out of Baghdad the day before.
McChrystal and his JSOC team watched Rahman for 17 consecutive days. Then, on June 6, 2006, it happened — Rahman’s family was seen piling into a vehicle and leaving the city. The next day, a Predator drone followed Rahman himself as he made his way northeast out of Baghdad, to a small house in a palm grove near the village of Hibhib. Rahman went inside. McChrystal had a commando team on the ground, 18 minutes away.
As McChrystal and his staff watched through the Predator camera, a man, dressed in black, walked from the house to the edge of the road. The man looked to his right, then to his left. It was Zarqawi. He walked back inside. They were sure it was him.
At an operations center, a senior Special Forces commander, realizing that time was short, ordered an airstrike. Two F-16’s were dispatched; one of them was hooked up to a refueling plane; the second jet was told to go alone. A pair of 500-pound bombs killed Zarqawi. McChrystal and his staff were waiting at JSOC’s headquarters in Balad when the corpse came in.
McChrystal’s tenure as JSOC’s commander was not flawless. JSOC never got its most wanted quarry, neither Osama bin Laden nor Ayman al-Zawahiri. One of JSOC’s units, Task Force 6-26, was cited for abusing detainees, many of them at a site known as Camp Nama, in Baghdad. McChrystal himself was not implicated, but at least 34 task-force members were disciplined. “There were cases where people made mistakes, and they were punished,” McChrystal told me. “What we did was establish a policy and atmosphere that said that is not what you do. That is not acceptable.”
He also signed off on the Silver Star recommendation for Cpl. Pat Tillman, the N.F.L. star and Army Ranger killed in Afghanistan in April 2004. The medal recommendation erroneously suggested that Tillman was killed by enemy fire; in fact he was killed accidentally by his own men, which McChrystal suspected at the time. The medal was awarded at a memorial service for Tillman, in which he was lionized as a man killed by the enemy.
McChrystal said he did indeed sign off on the recommendation for Tillman, because he believed it was warranted. The award was for valor, and Tillman had been extraordinarily brave, regardless of who killed him. McChrystal said he never intended for Tillman’s death to be exploited politically or to convey an incorrect impression about his death. “I certainly regret the way this came out,” McChrystal told me.
As for his current job, McChrystal said there are two lessons from Iraq that apply to Afghanistan. The first is that his role — killing insurgents — worked there only because it was part of a much larger effort to not only defeat the insurgency but also to build an Iraqi state that could stand on its own. “Ours was just a supporting effort,” he said. The second lesson is perhaps more startling. It is that no situation, no matter how dire, is ever irredeemable — if you have the time, resources and the correct strategy. In the spring of 2006, Iraq seemed lost. The dead were piling up. The society was disintegrating. One possible conclusion was that it was time for the United States to cut its losses in a country that it never truly understood. But the American military believed it had found a strategy that worked, and it hung in there, and it finally turned the tide.
“One of the big take-aways from Iraq was that you have to not lose confidence in what you are doing,” McChrystal said. “We were able to go to the edge of the abyss without losing hope.”
VI.
SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL in Afghanistan in June 2009, McChrystal sat down with the commanders of the 82nd Airborne Division, which oversees a broad swath of eastern Afghanistan. The briefing, given by the 82nd’s officers, was sophisticated but sobering: corruption in the Afghan government is pervasive, the officers said; the insurgency, supported from Pakistan, is resilient. Every valley and every village is different, each its own patchwork of ethnic groups and tribes, each with its own history. The Americans are having to learn them all.
“The environment is so complex that there is no overarching solution,” Brig. Gen. William Fuller told McChrystal.
When the briefing was finished, McChrystal looked around the room. “Gentlemen, I am coming into this job with 12 months to show demonstrable progress here — and 24 months to have a decisive impact,” he said. “That’s how long we have to convince the Taliban, the Afghan people and the American people that we’re going to be successful. In 24 months, it has to be obvious that we have the clear upper hand and that things are moving in the right direction. That’s not a choice. That’s a reality.”
In a tour of bases around Afghanistan, McChrystal repeated this mantra to all his field commanders: Time is running out.
Yet even if McChrystal’s plan succeeds, even if he can turn the Afghan venture around, neither he nor anyone else in the upper echelons of the military believes that the job — the one President Obama has given them to do — will be finished then.
“It feels like Iraq in 2004,” said Michael Flynn, McChrystal’s deputy. “Part of it is that the insurgency is stronger — we didn’t realize how strong it was. What we are trying to do is make sure everyone understands what it is we are facing — a much stronger insurgency, certainly much more capable. Their capacity to lay I.E.D.’s on the battlefield, for instance — it’s just stunning.”
I asked General Flynn to imagine the future here. “We are going to go in and ask for some resources,” he told me. “If those resources are brought to bear in a timely manner, I believe that it’s probably going to take us three years to really turn the insurgency to the point where it’s waning instead of waxing. To do that we have to fix the Afghan security forces, we have to build their capacity and capability, and we have to absolutely culturally change the way they operate. And then I think beyond those three years, we are looking at another two years when the government of Afghanistan and the security forces of Afghanistan begin to take a lot more personal responsibility. The challenge to us is: What can we do in 12 months? What should we expect? If people’s expectations are that we are going to have the south turned around, for instance, it’s not going to happen.”
The strategy that McChrystal, Flynn and the other senior commanders want to employ in Afghanistan has two main prongs: one hard, one soft.
In the military arena, McChrystal wants to put as many of his men as close to the Afghan people as he can. That means closing some of the smaller bases in remote valleys and opening them in densely populated areas like the Helmand River valley. Here, at least, military force will play a central role, at least in the early phase of his strategy, as the Americans fight their way into areas they have not been in before.
“The insurgency has to have access to the people,” McChrystal told me. “So we literally want to go in there and squat among the people. We want to make the insurgents come to us. Make them be the aggressors. What I want to do is get on the inside, looking out — instead of being on the outside looking in.”
“There will be a lot of fighting,” McChrystal added. “If we do this right, the insurgents will have to fight us. They will have no choice.”
And that’s the rub: the population-focused strategy requires more troops — as many as 40,000 more. This is the decision that confronts President Obama and his advisers now.
The other part of the military option is one with which McChrystal is familiar but does not completely control. It’s his old portfolio — killing and capturing insurgents and terrorists. Much of that is being carried out in Pakistan, where Al Qaeda’s leadership has gathered in havens just across the border from Afghanistan. Both bin Laden and Zawahiri are believed to be hiding there.
In Pakistan, a C.I.A.-led program using Predator drones to hunt down and kill leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban has proved remarkably successful, even if controversial inside Pakistan itself. To date, American officials say, they have killed 11 of the top 20 Al Qaeda leaders, without having to launch large-scale military operations across the border.
With its 180 million people, several dozen nuclear warheads and havens for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Pakistan is one wild card in McChrystal’s campaign. “If we are good here, it will have a good effect on Pakistan,” he told me. “But if we fail here, Pakistan will not be able to solve their problems — it would be like burning leaves on a windy day next door. And if Pakistan implodes, it will be very hard for us to succeed.”
The softer side of McChrystal’s strategy has two main thrusts: training Afghan soldiers and police and persuading insurgents to change sides. It is here where the best chances of long-term success in Afghanistan may lie.
The first of these is a vast, expensive and painstaking project. In the ninth year of the war, Afghan forces are neither large nor able enough to take over for NATO. The Afghan Army has about 85,000 soldiers, and the police force has about 80,000 men. McChrystal wants to boost the size of the army to about 240,000 and the police to 160,000. “I think we can do it,” he told me.
But experience suggests that it won’t be easy. In Iraq, the building of the security forces was fraught with disaster: in 2004 and 2005, Iraqi soldiers and the police disintegrated whenever they came under attack. In later years, Iraqi forces became more sectarian, with some Shiite-dominated units carrying out massacres of Sunni civilians. It was only much later — by early 2008 — that the Iraqi Army and the police began to show promise.
And Iraq was an urban and literate society. Afghanistan is neither. The Afghan police are widely seen as corrupt and complicit in the opium trade — the world’s largest. And while many Afghan soldiers have shown themselves willing to fight, it usually falls to the Americans and their NATO allies to pay them, feed them and support them in the field.
Earlier this year, Maj. Gen. Richard Formica, who oversees the training of the Afghan security forces, spoke to me about the difficulties of creating an army in a country where only one in four adults is literate. “What percentage of police recruits can read?” Formica asked when we met at his headquarters in Kabul. “When I was down in Helmand, where the Brits were training police officers, they said not only could none of them read but they didn’t understand what a classroom was. How can you train officers if they can’t write arrest reports?”
Perhaps McChrystal’s most intriguing idea is his belief that he can persuade large numbers of Taliban to change sides. Coaxing insurgents back into the fold was, after all, one key to pulling Iraq back from the brink of apocalypse. Beginning in late 2006, tens of thousands of Sunni tribesmen, many of them former insurgents, agreed to stop fighting and to come onto the payroll, usually as policemen. Almost overnight, the Iraqi insurgency was reduced to Al Qaeda fanatics and a handful of others who could be targeted by McChrystal’s commandos in JSOC. This shaky — very shaky — arrangement is still keeping what peace there is in Iraq today.
McChrystal says he intends to begin a similar effort in Afghanistan. The idea, he said, would not be to try to flip the Taliban’s leaders — that’s not likely — but rather its foot soldiers. The premise of the program, McChrystal says, is that most of the Taliban’s fighters are not especially committed ideologically and could be brought into society with promises of jobs and protection. “I’d like to go pretty high up,” McChrystal said, referring to the Taliban’s hierarchy. “It could be people who are commanders with significant numbers of troops. I think they can be given the opportunity to come in.”
The effort, McChrystal said, is based on his own reading of the Taliban and of Pashtun culture: most of the people fighting the United States, he argued, are motivated by local and personal grievances. They want more of a voice in local governance, for instance, or they want jobs. “Historically, the Pashtuns are very practical people,” McChrystal told me. “Pashtun culture adjudicates disagreements in a way that mitigates blood feuds. The Pashtun people go out of their way not to do things that cause permanent feuds. They have always been willing to change positions, change sides. I don’t think much of the Taliban are ideologically driven; I think they are practically driven. I’m not sure they wouldn’t flip to our side.”
To help him achieve this, McChrystal recruited his old friend Graeme Lamb, who played a similar role in Iraq. The trick in Iraq, Lamb said, was timing: by late 2006, many Iraqis, even the insurgents, had grown tired of fighting. “What we did in Iraq in mid-2006 — had we tried to do it in mid-2004, it would have crashed and burned,” Lamb told me. “Because at the end of the day, people hadn’t exercised their revenge. They hadn’t stood at the edge of the abyss and looked into it.”
Lamb said the time may have arrived for something similar in Afghanistan, if only because everyone is exhausted by so much war. “Now is a good time,” he said, “because people are very serious on all sides.”
The reconciliation plan might end up bringing into the fold some disreputable characters, but neither Lamb nor McChrystal has much of a problem with that. “In my view,” McChrystal said of the insurgents, “their past is not important. Some people say, ‘Well, they have blood on their hands.’ I’d say, ‘So do a lot of people.’ I think we focus on future behavior. They can enter the political process if they want to.”
The notion that large groups of Taliban fighters could be persuaded to quit is not new. Previous efforts have ended in failure, often because neither the Americans nor their allies were able to protect people who changed sides.
Earlier this year, for example, a local Taliban commander in Wardak Province named Abdul Jameel came forward with a group of fighters and declared that he wanted to quit. Wardak’s governor, Halim Fidai, accepted his surrender and told him he was free to go home. Two weeks later, Taliban gunmen entered Jameel’s home and killed him, his wife, his uncle, his brother and his daughter.
“We had nothing to offer him,” Fidai told me.
In another case, Gulab Mangal, the governor of Helmand Province, told me that during a recent American military operation he got a telephone call from a Taliban commander. “He wanted to surrender,” Mangal said. And then the military operation was over — and the American troops went back to their bases. “He never called back after that,” Mangal said.
With more American troops, McChrystal told me, he would be better able to squeeze the insurgents into changing sides. “I think a lot of them need to be convinced that they are not going to be successful,” he said.
So many things could scuttle McChrystal’s plans: a Taliban more intractable than imagined, the fractured nature of Afghan society and, no matter what President Obama does, a lack of soldiers and time. But there is something even worse, over which neither McChrystal nor his civilian comrades in the American government exercise much control: the government of Hamid Karzai, already among the most corrupt in the world, appears to have secured its large victory in nationwide elections in August by orchestrating the stealing of votes. A United Nations-backed group is trying to sort through the fraud allegations, and American diplomats are trying to broker some sort of power-sharing agreement with Karzai and his main rival, Abdullah Abdullah.
But increasingly, McChrystal, as well as President Obama and the American people, are being forced to confront the possibility that they will be stuck fighting and dying and paying for a government that is widely viewed as illegitimate.
When I asked McChrystal about this, it was the one issue that he seemed not to have thought through. What if the Afghan people see their own government as illegitimate? How would you fight for something like that?
“Then we are going to have to avoid looking like we are part of the illegitimacy,” the general said. “That is the key thing.”
VII.
A GROUP OF American Marines were bumping along a sandy road in their Humvee as the twilight turned to dark.
“One guy lost his legs,” Sgt. David Spaulding said, riding in the front passenger’s seat. “They were walking in a field.”
The Humvee bounced along some more.
“You know the guy who got shot in the head?” Lance Cpl. Jeremy Dones said, from a seat in the back. “They got him to Germany. His parents flew to Germany. They took him off life support.”
A moment passed.
“Apparently a guy got blown to pieces, and they can’t find all of him,” Spaulding said. “They don’t know if they have all the pieces.”
The men rode together in silence.
McChrystal’s plans come to earth along the banks of the Helmand River, where members of the 2/8 Battalion are trying to retake a 20-mile stretch of orchards and villages around the city of Garmsir. The 2/8 Battalion, about 800 men, is part of the 10,000 Marines dispatched to Helmand by President Obama earlier this year.
Since arriving in early July, the 2/8 has lost 13 men, most to homemade bombs. About five times that number have been wounded. The Marines here fight nearly every day.
Yet for all their difficulties, the battalion’s progress has been real. Garmsir, a district of about 90,000 people, boasts a functioning government with a governor and a local council. About 300 Afghan soldiers are deployed here, led by an Afghan colonel educated at the United States Army’s school for its best junior officers. About 250 Afghan police officers are stationed at bridges and checkpoints. An array of public-works projects is under way.
Most important, the town of Garmsir and the villages around it are quiet. They are part of an area, roughly six miles wide and six miles long, that has been secured by the Marines along the east bank of the Helmand. They call the area “the snake’s head” for its oblong shape. Outside of Garmsir, the Taliban roam and attack. Inside, life for local Afghans is remarkably sane.
Garmsir is a devastated and impoverished place; 30 years of war has seen to that. None of its roads are paved, leaving the farmers unable to sell their grapes and corn in markets outside of town. There are no cellphones, no electricity, no running water. Building a city here that could function on its own would take many years. But in Garmsir’s calm, the first hints of normal life are beginning to show.
One day in August, I tagged along with a group of Marines to the monthly meeting of Garmsir’s district council. Our leader was Capt. Micah Caskey, a civil-affairs officer from Irmo, S.C. At 28, Caskey had already done two tours in the hardest years of the Iraq war. In 2007, he left the Marines to begin a dual graduate degree in law and business at the University of South Carolina. He spent the summer of 2008 studying law abroad. But he stayed in the Marine Reserve, and a few months ago they called him back.
“I had a job all lined up for the summer,” Caskey said. “And now I’m here for seven months. I can’t tell you it was easy. Sometimes it really makes me wonder.”
Garmsir’s governor, Abdullah Jan, arrived ahead of the meeting, and he and Caskey and a group of Marines sat in the courtyard of the district headquarters in a circle of plastic chairs. Governor Jan is the beneficiary of Afghanistan’s strangely centralized political system; he was appointed by Helmand’s governor, Mangal, who was directly appointed by Karzai.
Caskey’s experience in Iraq shows immediately. He is unfailingly polite, even deferential, to Jan. And each time one of the councilmen enters, he stops the conversation and rises to shake his hand.
“Peace be upon you,” Caskey said to Jan. “It’s very nice to see you after so long.”
Jan, who grew up in the district, told Caskey not to worry about local support for the Taliban — there wasn’t any. But in the absence of a stable government, and with no guarantee of safety, ordinary Afghans were often forced to go along. “I can assure you that the people of Garmsir appreciate what you are doing here,” Jan said. “Unfortunately the people are held hostage by the Taliban.”
An Afghan — one of Jan’s assistants — arrived bearing a tray of tea and cakes while Jan talked.
“Ninety percent of the local people support the government,” Jan told Caskey. “Maybe 10 percent really like the Taliban.”
That seemed an overstatement; there were too many roadside bombs in the area — even inside the snake’s head. But the point Jan was making seemed valid enough: once there is law and order, public opinion begins to change.
“You guys,” Jan said, looking at Caskey and the other Americans, “you come in, you help and then you leave. The Afghan people are not 100 percent sure that you are going to stay. They are not sure they won’t have their throats cut if they tell the Americans where a bomb is.”
The council’s meeting began with its 16 members taking their seats on the floor of a large, airy room. Caskey and the other Americans sat in the back. The agenda for the meeting was to decide on a list of development projects, which the Americans would pay for. As Caskey explained, the Americans didn’t want to direct the projects — they wanted to strengthen the Afghan leaders by funneling the money through them.
“The Americans are only going to pay for projects that we decide on,” Jan announced. “It’s up to us.”
The Afghans — all men — began to talk. Their first choice was unanimous: the main sluice gates that lead to the irrigation canals off the Helmand River, built by American aid workers in the 1950s, were badly in need of repair. Some of the fields were going dry.
“It’s been 30 years since anyone did any work on that canal,” Hajji Anwar, one of the councilmen, said.
With the meeting under way, Caskey and the other Americans got up to leave. “I have one request,” Caskey said to one mullah. “Would you be willing to record a message that we can play over the radio station saying that fighting the government violates the idea of jihad — that it’s not jihad?”
Jan thought for a second and nodded. Caskey and the other Marines strapped on their helmets.
“May you have a son just like yourself,” Jan told him.
VIII.
THE ABANDONED ELEMENTARY school in Mian Poshteh that houses the 240 Marines of 2/8’s Echo Company has no bedrooms, no beds, no electricity, no water. It’s a vacant, dirty building filled with tired and dirty men. They sleep on the floor, a dozen to a room, or they sleep in the dirt outside, shirtless in the heat. They fight every day. When the Marines don’t attack the Taliban, the Taliban attack the Marines.
No Americans have ever come this far south before, at least not permanently. With fewer than 8,000 British troops covering all of Helmand, there never were enough to go around. Garmsir is 12 miles up a single dusty road, where Echo Company’s supply convoys get bombed nearly every day.
Mian Poshteh is like Garmsir but worse. There is no government: no mayor, no city council, no police. Thirty Afghan soldiers live here, only 10 of whom leave the base at any given time. As in Garmsir, the Marines in Mian Poshteh have come to build a government — but they have to defeat the Taliban first.
“We’re not going to clear anything that we can’t hold onto,” said Capt. Eric Meador, Echo Company’s commander.
Even with 240 men, they can’t hold onto much. By the time Echo Company and the rest of the 2/8 leave at the end of October, Meador said, he would like to control a perimeter that extends perhaps a mile and a half around his fort. “I’d be doing pretty well,” he said. To the south, there isn’t another Marine base for miles.
When you see a place like Mian Poshteh — wild, broken and isolated — it’s not difficult to see why McChrystal believes he doesn’t have enough troops to do what President Obama has asked him to.
One of Echo Company’s typical days unfolded in late August, when the Marines set out on foot for a village named Tarakai. Led by a young lieutenant, Patrick Nevins, 24, from Chapel Hill, N.C., Echo Company’s First Platoon walked through a vast field of shoulder-high corn. The fields had been flooded recently, so they were filled with muck. The trek might have been easier had the Marines taken the farmers’ raised footpaths, but the Taliban had taken to laying land mines in those, so the Marines waded straight into the field itself. The mud below was crisscrossed by gullies and rows of broken ground. The helmets of the Marines bobbed above the top of the corn.
The fields, deep and green, were eerily empty of other men.
“I guess all the farmers took the day off,” Nevins said, hacking his way through the corn.
Helmand’s summers are long and merciless, and on this day the temperature hovered around 120 degrees. Crossing the fields, with all the muck, it was hotter still. Nevins and his men tromped through the corn in full gear, including helmets and flak jackets. In the heat, my own boots fell apart.
As he walked, Nevins talked a little about himself. He seemed an unlikely presence in the fields of Helmand. His father is a cancer researcher at Duke University. “My dad is really good at what he does,” Nevins said, hacking and pushing his way through the mud and corn. “I guess I didn’t want to compete with him.”
An hour later, Nevins’s platoon popped out on the other side. Behind them were trails of toppled corn. “Sorry about your field,” Nevins said to an Afghan man standing nearby.
“It’s O.K.,” he said.
We arrived at Tarakai. A group of Afghans lined up. They were talking about the Afghan presidential election, to be held only a few days later.
“We can’t vote,” said Hakmatullah, who, like many Afghans, has only one name. “Everybody knows it. We are farmers, and we cannot do a thing against the Taliban.”
The others said much the same. The Taliban had passed word that they would cut off the right index finger of anyone caught casting a ballot. Not that there was much chance of that: the area around Mian Poshteh was so anarchic that the Afghan government didn’t send anyone to register voters. The closest polling place was in Garmsir.
But there was more to talk about. “The children are frightened,” one of the men said.
And so were the adults. The Taliban owned Tarakai; they taxed the corn and kept watch over the town.
“When you leave here, the Taliban will come at night and ask us why we were talking to you,” a villager told Nevins. “If we cooperate, they would kill us.”
“They will cut out our stomachs,” another man said.
“Is there anything I can do for you?” Nevins asked.
“Don’t come close to our houses,” the first villager said. “Don’t try to negotiate with us.”
Nevins was polite but insistent. The Americans were here now, and they were going to stay. “I will try to be respectful, and I will try to keep my distance,” Nevins told the men. “But I have a job to do, and I need to be able to come by from time to time.”
An old man with a long white beard stepped forward. “We’re afraid you’re going to leave this place after a few months,” the old man said. “And the Taliban will take their revenge.”
“I promise you,” Lieutenant Nevins said, “we will be here when the weather gets cold, and when it gets hot again.”
Nevins shook hands with the Afghans and said goodbye. Then he turned, and his men disappeared into the cornfield.
IX.
IN AMERICA, the chorus is insistent and growing: scale back the Afghan mission. It’s too hard and too expensive, and we’ve overstayed our welcome.
George F. Will, the columnist, recently said as much. So did Rory Stewart, the British scholar-diplomat who has spent years in the region. Vice President Biden is said to favor such a choice.
The exact shape of a scaled-down commitment is not clear, but it goes something like this: American Special Forces units, aided by Predator drones, can keep Al Qaeda off-balance, while American soldiers stay on to train the Afghan Army and the police.
It’s an attractive argument, of course: it offers the hope that the United States can achieve the same thing — American security — at a much-reduced cost. (The fate of the Afghan people themselves is basically left out of this equation.)
Last month, I visited Richard Haass, one of the idea’s chief proponents, at his office in New York, where he is president of the Council on Foreign Relations. (Before that, through June 2003, Haass was director of policy planning at the State Department under President George W. Bush.)
Haass is particularly persuasive, in part because he does not pretend to have easy answers. After eight years of mismanagement and neglect, Haass says, every choice the United States faces in Afghanistan is dreadful. The weight of the evidence, he says, suggests that curtailing our ambitions is the option least dreadful.
“It’s not self-evident that doing more will accomplish more,” Haass told me. “And I’m skeptical about how central Afghanistan is anymore to the global effort against terror. I’m not persuaded that you can transform the situation there.”
The bulk of Al Qaeda’s leadership, Haass pointed out, is now in Pakistan. That’s where the United States should really be focused — in Pakistan, with a population six times larger than Afghanistan’s and with at least 60 nuclear warheads. “No one wants Afghanistan to become a sponge that absorbs a disproportionate share of our country’s resources,” he said.
General McChrystal and most of the rest of the Pentagon say that Haass’s argument is essentially an illusion. If the United States drew down substantially in Afghanistan, they say, much of the country would quickly be overrun by the Taliban, rendering the other things — training and counterterrorism — impossible. Al Qaeda would return, possibly to the place it had before the 9/11 attacks, and Pakistan would be likely to follow.
When I pitched McChrystal’s counterargument to Haass, he said he was glad that he wasn’t in Obama’s shoes. “Let’s not kid ourselves,” he said. “We’re not going to find some wonderful thing that’s going to deliver large positive results at modest costs. It’s not going to happen.”
Haass went on to say: “I keep going back to Yogi Berra. You know: ‘When you reach a fork in the road, take it.’ I bet there are days when Obama wakes up and sees the fork in the road and decides he’s not going to take it. Because both choices are so bad.”
X.
DURING HIS TRIP to Garmsir, Stanley McChrystal took a moment to meet with Abdullah Jan, the governor. The two sat down in the same council chambers where Jan had met with Captain Caskey.
“Tell me how we can do better,” McChrystal said.
Jan thought for a second, then offered an unusual answer.
“You need to live in a building, not a bunch of tents,” he said.
McChrystal gave him a quizzical look.
“Everyone in Garmsir sees that you are living in tents, and they know that you are going to be leaving soon,” Jan told McChrystal. “You need to build something permanent — a building. Because your job here is going to take years. Only then will people be persuaded that you are going to stay.”
McChrystal nodded.
“We’ll stay as long as we have to until our Afghan partners are completely secure,” he said. “Even if that means years.”
McChrystal started to get up, but Jan wasn’t finished yet.
“The Afghan people are impatient,” he said. “We’ve been waiting for 30 years! We don’t want to wait any longer. We’re impatient!”
McChrystal held back a smile.
“Believe me,” he told Jan. “I work for a lot of impatient people, too.”